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COORDINATED TRANSNATIONAL
INTERACTION IN CIVIL LITIGATION
AND ARBITRATION
Peter F Schlosser*
INTRODUCTION

About fifteen years ago, an English shipowner chartered his vessel,
the Mareva, to time charterers. After a while, the charterers discontinued payment on the charter and the shipowner instituted court proceedings against them. The plaintiff, concerned about the ability and
willingness of the defendants to satisfy an expected judgment, simultaneously applied for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants
from disposing of a subcharter which had been paid into their London
bank account. The injunction was granted.I Since then, injunctions of
this kind have been denominated "Mareva injunctions," although it
was the second, rather than the first, case where such an injunction
2
had been given.
Lawyers on the continent initially reacted with an indulgent smile,
which expressed the feeling that it had taken the English until the end
of the twentieth century to establish a legal innovation that civil law
countries, such as France, Germany and others, had maintained as a
long-standing tradition under various names such as "Arrest" (Germany), 3 "saisie conservatoire" (France) 4 or "sequestro" (Italy).5
Common law countries have always been very reluctant to provide
prejudgment relief, particularly when the defendant domiciliary or resident was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Even the
United States affords only limited possibilities of obtaining prejudgment attachment or garnishment, the primary aim of which has always been to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction rather than to protect
* Professor of Law, University of Munich; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (1990).
1. Mareva Compania Naviera S. A. v. International Bulk Carriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 509 (C.A.).
2. Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A. 1975).
3. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] §§ 916-945 (W. Ger.).
4. CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE [C. PR. civ.] arts. 48-58, 557-582 (Fr.).
5. See infra note 18. Even a recent English observer commented that "the Mareva jurisdiction brought the English common law (and those jurisdictions which follow it) into line with the
practice of civil law countries ....
Collins, The TerritorialReach of Mareva Injunctions, 105
LAW Q. REV. 262, 263 (1989).
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the plaintiff from the disappearance of assets subsequent to the institution of the proceedings. 6 Occasionally, in fact, unlimited appearance
of the defendant has constituted sufficient grounds to vacate the
seizure because the seizure had become obsolete as a prerequisite to
7
maintaining the jurisdiction of the court.
Soon, however, it became apparent that the legal nature and the
practical usefulness of a Mareva injunction was quite different from
the characteristics of an "Arrest" or a "saisie conservatoire." The English Court of Appeal itself called the innovation "one of the most imaginative, important and, on the whole, most beneficial of modern
8
times."
A few months ago, the same English Court of Appeal granted a
Mareva injunction against Haiti's former president Jean-Claude
Duvalier and some of his relatives at the request of the government of
Haiti. 9 At issue in the proceedings was the restitution of assets
Duvalier was accused of having illegally acquired and removed from
Haiti. The injunction ordered:' 0
(1) that the defendants refrain from dealing with assets which represented the proceeds of the payments complained of in the main
proceedings;
(2) that the defendants refrain from removing assets from the jurisdiction of the English court or dealing with those assets;
(3) that the defendants disclose information about the nature, location
and value of defendants' assets.
The court called this injunction "world-wide" for three reasons. First,
it was unknown where the proceeds of the payments complained of in
the main proceedings were located. The injunction was restraining the
Duvaliers from dealing with them irrespective of the jurisdiction in
which they were located."I Second, the same was true with regard to
the disclosure order. Most of the assets were not likely to be located in
the United Kingdom. Third, and most important, the proceedings on
the substance of the matter were being conducted in France. Why the
government of Haiti sought preliminary protective relief in England,
6. For details, see S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION
240-44 (4th ed. 1987).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 6223(a) (McKinney 1980). This was the presumption
in Cargill, Inc. v. Sabine Trading & Shipping Co., 756 F. 2d 224 (2d Cir. 1985).
8. Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v. R'as al Kaimah National Oil Co.,
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023, 1036 (C.A.).
9. Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 261 (C.A.).
10. The precise wording of the injunction has not been reported.
11. In Ashtiani v. Kashi [1987] 1 Q.B. 888 (C.A.), the same court, though another panel, had
still expressed its view to the contrary, limiting the restraining order to assets within the
jurisdiction.
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rather than France, might seem perplexing, but this kind of interim
relief was unknown in French law, and the English judiciary was regarded as the only one providing an adequate remedy to find out
where Duvalier held all the assets in question.
Hence, in no more than fifteen years between Mareva and
Duvalier, the flexibility of interim protective measures under English
law has surpassed that of the traditional standard of civil law countries. It has outdone it to such a degree that plaintiffs in continental
courts now feel compelled to go before the English judiciary to borrow
its recently developed magic curial arm. This did not happen because
the territorial limits of the French jurisdiction would have been any
obstacle to giving adequate protection. It happened because of the internal shortcomings of French civil procedure - even though the
French "nouveau code de procddure civile" was enacted as recently as
the early seventies.
Two phases in the short history of Mareva injunctions should be
mentioned in order to facilitate subsequent discussion. Soon after their
invention, Mareva injunctions, which were initially only prohibitive,
came to be accompanied by supplements ordering the defendant to
disclose what assets he had and where (within the jurisdiction) they
were located. Because Mareva injunctions were judge-made law,
judges had little scruple in finding implied or ancillary powers to order
any activity necessary to achieve the goal of Mareva injunctions, 2 including disclosure orders directed to third parties such as banks holding assets in account for defendants.' 3 This legal situation remained
unaltered when in 1981 the courts' power to issue Mareva injunctions
became incorporated into the Supreme Court Act. The definition
given therein is:
"Injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from
the jurisdiction of the High Court or otherwise dealing with assets..
(sec. 37 (3)).
This provision, by referring to assets "within the jurisdiction," makes
it appropriate to turn to the second phase in the evolution of Mareva
injunctions. This wording, which indicates that such a provisional
measure was available only if the subject matter of the proceedings
was also litigated in England,' 4 was aimed at excluding "world-wide"
restraining orders. Only one year later, however, the provision was
modified when the United Kingdom became a party to the Brussels
12. Bekhor & Co. v. Bilton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 923, 936-42 (C.A.).
13. Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, I W.L.R. 1274 (C.A. 1980).
14. As had previously been decided in The Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera, 1979 App.
Cas. 210, 223.
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EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters.' 5 Pursuant to the Convention, provisional measures in one contracting State are available to litigants irrespective of where among contracting States' 6 the substance of the
matter is litigated. Implementing legislation in the United Kingdom
provided for an Order in Council to widen the scope of this provision,
which would allow provisional measures to be granted also in support
of litigation in other than European Community countries. So far no
such order has been issued. Yet it is supposed that no obstacle exists
to such issuance, in principle, since the continental Community States
have an established tradition of allowing provisional protective meas17
ures in support of foreign proceedings.
Therefore, in a transnational perspective, the surprising and innovative element of the British Duvalier decision is not so much the support which the British courts gave to foreign proceedings as the
twofold nature of this support. First, the court of one State gives protective support to main proceedings pending in a foreign court by
making orders of a kind which the latter court, by virtue of its own
law, is prevented from making. International piecemeal litigation is
favored in order to maximize the overall effectiveness of judicial relief.
Second, information useful and even crucial to the main proceedings
can be obtained without any request or leave of the court of the main
proceedings, which would lack power to issue such a leave or such
request under any circumstance. Both branches of the innovation, as
well as the prospects for its transplantation into other legal orders,
such as the United States or Germany, will be discussed in the two
subsequent parts of this study.
15. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27, § 25:
(1) The High Court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland shall have power to grant interim relief where (a) proceedings have been or are to be commenced in a Contracting State other than the
United Kingdom or in a part of the United Kingdom other than that in which the High
Court in question exercises jurisdiction; and
(b) they are or will be proceedings whose subject-matter is within the scope of the 1968
Convention as determined by Article I (whether or not the Convention has effect in
relation to the proceedings).
(2) On an application for any interim relief under subsection (1)the court may refuse to grant
that relief if, in the opinion of the court, the fact that the court has no jurisdiction apart from
this section in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings in question makes it inexpedient for the court to grant it."
16. And soon also amongst six other European states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland), which decided (subject to parliamentary ratification) to adhere to the
Brussels Convention.
17. See infra and accompanying text.
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WORLDWIDE FREEZING OF PROPERTY IN AID OF DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN LITIGATION ON THE SUBSTANCE

In civil law countries such as France, Germany and Italy,' 8 it always has been beyond question that interim protective measures are
available, regardless of the forum which has jurisdiction on the merits' 9 of the case. To give just one remarkable example 20 : when the
Iranian revolution broke out, the new government publicly announced
its decision to discontinue repayment of debts. It also ordered its nationals and corporate entities to do likewise, whereupon American and
English banks obtained in a German court the garnishment of the
Iranians' German bank accounts. The seizure of the 190 million German marks was of particular value to the banks because, unlike
Mareva injunctions 2' and American freezing injunctions, the attachment gave security to them. The German courts, however, did not
have jurisdiction as to the merits of the case due to arbitration clauses
included in the respective agreements.
The United States seems to have more problems with dissociating
interim protective relief from proceedings on the merits. Before discussing this question, however, we must clarify the relationship between attachment and preliminary injunctions, which is a great
problem in civil law countries and is well known in the United States.
A.

(World-wide) freezing of assets injunctions in lieu of attachments
(orpre-judgment garnishments)

Like Jean-Claude Duvalier in France, Ferdinand Marcos was sued
in the United States by his successors in government. The claim was
18. As to Germany, see infra note 20.
In France, article 48 of the code de procidurecivile ancienne (still in force with regard to
creditors' remedies) gives power to issue a "saisie conservatoire" to the courts where the
assets to be seized are situated. The claim for the merits must be timely brought into the
competent court, which, however, may be a foreign one.
Article 680 of the Italian "codice di procedura civile" deals expressly with situations
where Italian jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter is lacking, and provides in such
cases for special proceedings for validation not amounting to final adjudication.
In order to avoid any ambiguity in this respect, the Brussels convention made it
mandatory for the legal order of the Member States to have protective measures available
"even if, under this Convention, the Courts of another contracting State have jurisdiction as
to the substance of the matter."
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. Judgment of May 11, 1981, Oberlandesgericht, W. Ger., Frankfurt, 34 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2650; Judgment of Apr. 12, 1983, BVerfGE, W. Ger., 36 NJW
2766. While the issue of jurisdiction as to the merits was not discussed there, it can be inferred
from the normal practice of the National Iranian Oil Company that the usual dispute resolution
provisions were included in the agreements it had entered into with the plaintiffs.
21. See Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A., [1981] Q.B. 65; see generally
Collins, supra note 5, at 269.
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for restitution and damages (including $50 billion in punitive damages). The government of the Philippines sought a preliminary injunction restraining Marcos, his wife and some other persons close to the
Marcoses from dealing with their assets (except for normal living expenses and legal fees), wherever located. While the district court
granted the injunction, the Marcos family won the second round when
the Ninth Circuit adopted the defendant's theory that all that Marcos
22
was blamed for was covered by act of state immunity principles.
Nevertheless, the third and final round (with regard to interim protective measures) went to the Philippine government. After a rehearing,
the Ninth Circuit en banc correctly decided that room for reviewing
Marcos' acts existed, since the government of the Philippines itself insisted on such review. 23 This opened the way to decide whether a preliminary injunction can be given in lieu of attachments and
garnishments - a problem with a general and a transnational aspect.
a) Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 specifies in very clear terms the availability of
"seizure of property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action." However, in the
Marcos case, state law controlled. California, where the proceedings
against Marcos were instituted, does not allow prejudgment attachment other than for the protection of contractual claims. 24 Therefore,
it is arguable that temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions aimed at freezing assets would amount to circumvention of
the rules about non-availability of attachments in other than contractbased claims. Such an argument seems all the more plausible since, as
the Ninth Circuit itself put it, "a freeze of assets has the effect of an
25
attachment."
Indeed, such a conclusion was what some courts had hitherto
reached. These courts emphasized the "equitable nature" of a preliminary injunction and inferred that it could not issue where the underlying substance matter was a "legal" claim for damages, whether
liquidated or not, 26 and irrespective of the prospect of ultimate satis22. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F. 2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, reh'g
granted, 838 F.2d 1110, different result on reh'g, 862 F.2d 1355 (1988)(en banc), cert. denied. 109
S.Ct. 1933 (1989).
23. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F. 2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988)(en banc), cert.
denied 109 S.Ct. 1933 (1989).
24. Id. at 1361.
25. Id.
26. Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gearhart
Indus. v. Smith, 741 F. 707, 716 (5th Cir. 1984); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596
F. 2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979). See particularly Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 85-86
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
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faction of the judgment. 27 Some found themselves driven to give a
somewhat artificial "equitable" basis to the substance of the matter,
such as rescission of a constructive trust 2 8 to show that the underlying
claim was not just for money.
All these kinds of problems apparently were not a major concern
for the Ninth Circuit when ruling on the Marcos case. It simply said
that "while a freeze of assets has the effect of an attachment, it is not
an attachment. The court has power to preserve the status quo by
'29
equitable means. A preliminary injunction is such a means."
Though this wording seems to favor the implication that the nature of the substance of the matter is irrelevant, the court nevertheless
focused on the fact that the district court judge who granted the injunction had qualified one of the counts of the complaint as deriving
from a constructive trust.3 0 Consequently, the preliminary injunction
was for the protection of equitable remedies. The appellate judges
framed their review in terms of abuse of discretion and so did not say
whether the issuance of a preliminary freezing injunction was limited
to the protection of equitable remedies. In a previous judgment, however, such a requirement was clearly stated.3"
Whatever may be inferred from all this with regard to the actual
position of the Ninth Circuit, such a requirement is not sound in policy, nor is it a compelling inference from the wording of the provision.
Absent binding precedent, one should not state it. Attachments and
preliminary injunctions are both subject to the more general and even
constitutional3 2 principle that remedies necessary to the efficiency of
court proceedings must be available, including protection of the plaintiff from his opponent's activities aimed at detracting from, or even
obliterating, the implementation of the judgment ultimately to be entered. Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
must, therefore, be regarded as subsidiary remedies to be granted in
any case where legal remedies prove to be insufficient. This is pre27. Philatelic Foundation v. Kaplan, No. 85 Civ. 8571 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986)(WESTLAW,
OCT database).
28. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F. 2d 554 (5th Cir. 1987); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. N.H. Singer, Inc. 668 F. 2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'g 534 F. Supp. 24
(N.D. Cal. 1981) ("Rescission is an old equitable remedy and the district court has power to issue
a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo in order to protect the possibility of that
equitable remedy.").
29. See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988)(citations
omitted).
30. Id. at 1362.
31. Singer, 668 F. 2d at 1112. See supra note 28.
32. See infra note 46.
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cisely the line the District Court for the Southern District of New
York has adopted, saying:
Where . . . the harm that may be inflicted during the pending of an
action cannot be calculated with the certainty that would make damages
an adequate remedy the "irreparable
injury" aspect of the preliminary
33
injunction standard is satisfied.
A closer review of the reported cases reveals that many other
courts which did not grant injunctive relief did not in principle exclude the availability of any equitable interim relief in order to protect
"legal" claims. Rather, on the basis of their discretion (which would
not exist, should preliminary injunctions be confined to permanent equitable remedies), they reserved the right to decide otherwise in extraordinary cases. 34 The more state law limits the availability of
attachments or garnishments, the more preliminary injunctions become available, subject, of course, to very prudent discretionary practice. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor general
principles of curial law indicate restriction, in principle, of equitable
interim relief to the protection of equitable claims.
Some courts have already disfavored such a restriction outright.
Temporary restraining orders, undoubtedly also "equitable remedies,"
have been granted by some courts in order to secure the levy of a
subsequent or concurrent attachment on individual assets. 35 An "equitable" provisional measure has thus become some kind of second
degree interim protection for a first degree "legal" prejudgment remedy. More than a decade ago, the Fifth Circuit decided that "even
were [plaintiff's] remedy limited to damages, an injunction may issue
to protect that remedy." '36 Recently, the Sixth Circuit expressed its
willingness to grant interim freezing orders whenever "the legal rem' 37
edy provided by the state's attachment statutes ... is inadequate."
b) Liberal access to "equitable" interim relief, being generally
sound in policy, is particularly compelling in a context where, on a
matter of principle, attachments or garnishments cannot be ordered
though the substance of the matter is clearly a claim for money. This
is so whenever the court lacks power to order an attachment or a gar33. Milstead v. 0 Records & Visuals, Ltd. No. 84 Civ. 3657 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1984)(LEXIS,
Genfed library, Cases file) (citing Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F. 2d 631, 644
(2d Cir. 1979)("[W]e think it clear that Ives showed 'irreparable injury' at least in the sense of

impracticability of establishing the amount of damages .... " Ives Laboratories, 601 F.2d at 635
n.4 (dictum)).

34. E.g., Jackson Dairy Inc. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 576 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
35. E.g., Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979).
36. Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Central Am. Beef& Seafood Trading Co., 621 F. 2d 683, 686
(5th Cir. 1980); accord, Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp. 511 F. 2d 655 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Ebsco Industries, Inc., v. Lilly, 840 F. 2d 333, 336, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).
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nishment because the respective assets are not located within its jurisdiction. Attachments require jurisdiction "in rem." Assets located
abroad can never be subjected to an attachment of a domestic court.
Whether the foreign court for the place where the assets are located
has power to issue an attachment order, whether such a court can
timely be identified (in the absence of information about the location
of assets) and whether attachment proceedings can timely be commenced to secure the meaningful substance matter adjudication may
be very doubtful. If, for example, Marcos had owned assets in the
United Kingdom, the British courts would not have had power to order a Mareva injunction.3 8 The American court having personal jurisdiction over Marcos was prevented, pursuant to California law, from

attaching Marcos' assets within the jurisdiction. More important, because the court lacked jurisdiction in rem, it was also precluded from
seizing the major part of the former president's assets, which were located in a variety of foreign countries. Since, unlike attachments, temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions require personal
jurisdiction, only these remedies are suitable for indirectly reaching
assets abroad as well. Because it is permissible under international law
to order a person, otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction, to maintain activities abroad or not to commit acts abroad, 39 no reason exists
for not allowing injunctions restraining him from dealing with assets
abroad.
c) A small comparative survey reveals that some civil law States
have similar problems, though in a slightly different formal context.
Civil law States ignore the distinction between personal and in rem
jurisdiction. 4° "Arrest" or "sequestro" are in Germany or Italy, re38. See supra text following note 16.
39. Courts of many nations have ordered acts to be committed abroad; none has ever expressed any doubt about being entitled to do so: e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (anti-suit injunction); Judgment of Apr. 9, 1986,
Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 7 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHREN-

SRECHTS 176 (1987)(blood samples in paternity proceedings); id. at 153 note P. Schlosser;
Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 232, 252 (Neill, L.J.) ("There is abundant
authority for the proposition that, where a defendant is personally subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, an injunction may be granted in appropriate circumstances to control his activities
abroad"); Judgment of Feb. 23, 1988, Oberster Gerichtshof, Aus., 110 Juristische Blitter 459
(construction of a nuclear power plant); contra Judgment of Apr. 29, 1989, No. 6 N/503/89,
Oberster Gerichtshof, Aus. (not yet published) (based on grounds of state immunity, although
the issue was not raised in very clear terms). See generally R. THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION 487 (2d ed. 1989); G. BORN & D. WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 242 (1989); Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of

Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14
MINN. L.REV. 494 (1930). In the context of extraterritorial discovery, many incorrect statements
to the contrary were made; see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
40. The very concept of personal jurisdiction is unknown. The "competence" of the courts
has never been derived from physical power over persons.
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spectively, general orders relating to all the assets (or at least movables) of the defendant and allow levies on whatever objects or
garnishment of whatever funds payable to the debtor the creditor can
uncover. Within the framework of the Brussels Convention, an
4
"Arrest" and a "sequestro" are even extraterritorially enforceable, '
because the concept of jurisdiction in rem (or quasi in rem) has always
been unknown in civil law countries. Still, outside the scope of the
Brussels Convention, traditional concepts of international comity as
applied in this field have only allowed enforcement of final judgments
on the merits. Hence, as in common law countries, the effectiveness of
justice in civil law States requires that extraterritorial injunctions become available and sanctioned, unlike attachment orders, by contempt
of court penalties.
To abide by such an imperative of curial justice seems to be impossible in German law. Though not grounded in the dichotomy of law
and equity, German law has adopted the doctrine that the "Arrest" is
exclusive of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. 4 2 Thus "Arrest" is the only provisional protective measure available if the subject matter claim is for a money judgment only.4 3 Since
the law/equity dichotomy has always been lacking in German law,
one cannot find adequate relief even through the invention of something like a constructive trust. Claims for restitution (including unjust
enrichment) are claims for money if non-specified items are sought.
Even so, another legal device that overcomes the rigidity of the German tradition exists with respect to provisional protective measures.
This device is found in the fact that civil law tradition does not require
courts to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. Any court may, at
any time, adopt legal opinions inconsistent with often reconfirmed
case law of the highest courts of the country. The court need only
state that codified law (and, in theory, all the law is supposed to be
derived from codified rules) has hitherto been misconceived. Such a
court may draw additional support by invoking constitutional
principles.
This is precisely what should be done in our field. Nowhere in the
German "Zivilprozessordnung," not even in the text relating to interim
protective relief, is there any indication that preliminary injunctions
41. See, e.g., Calzaturificio Brennero sas v. Wendel GmbH Schuhproduktion, 1984 E.C.R.
3971.
42. In German law, both are called "einstweilige Verfugungen," because the "temporary"
character of the latter becomes obsolete should the defendant abstain from applying for a
hearing.
43. This is uncontroversial. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 2142-43 (§ 916) (R. Z6ller ed.

1987).
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should be available for the protection of monetary claims." As the
constitutional court has emphasized time and again, 4 5 constitutional
principles of "Rechtsstaatlichkeit"' 46 require preliminary protective
measures to be available "in time." When an attachment ("Arrest")
proves inadequate or unsuitable, preliminary injunctions must fill the
gap. An attachment order might, perhaps, be accompanied by a preliminary injunction ordering the debtor to disclose the existence and
locatio.i of assets and to refrain from dealing with them. Though an
attachment order entitles the creditor to interrogate the debtor about
his assets, the latter may find plenty of time and opportunity to dissipate or reallocate them.
Regrettably enough, one ingenious component of the English
Mareva injunction is only partially suited for reconsideration of the
traditional understanding of German law. Under German law, third
parties are not directly approachable through attachment or preliminary injunction. In the Duvalier case, entities, banks especially, were
informed of the issuance of the world-wide injunction. 4 7 Consequently, the third parties would have been subject to contempt of
court penalties if they had chosen to follow the instructions of their
customers given in disregard of the injunction. Indeed, aiding and
abetting contempt is in itself contempt. 48 However, under German
law, only the defendant in proceedings and addressee of a court's order can be fined or imprisoned for contempt. 4 9 Yet, a bank informed
44. Id. at 2184 (§ 935) ("Preliminary injunctions in view of the object in litigation are permissible, should there be reason to apprehend that, by an alteration of existing circumstances, the
rights of one of the parties will become irreparably injured or more difficult to pursue"); Id. at
2192 (§ 940) ("Preliminary injunctions are also permissible for the purpose of temporarily settling the terms of a disputed legal relationship . . . should such a settlement become necessary,
especially in order to avoid imminent hardship or force").
45. See the decisions discussed by Schmidt-Assman in GRUNDESETZ KOMMENTAR 149 (T.
Maunz & G. Dirig eds. 1990).
46. The proper translation in the present context would probably be "equal protection" and
"due process." So far, American courts have not ruled on the issue in a straightforward way.
Nevertheless, they have emphasized that the right to be heard in court "must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965),
accord, Little v. Strater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
The rulings were given in view of defendants, or even persons not informed about the pendency
of proceedings involving their rights. No "meaningful" opportunity to be heard had been given
to these persons. The inverse issue of a plaintiff whose suit risks becoming "meaningless" absent
interim relief can hardly be decided otherwise. In a case where an administrative authority had
already taken action, the District Court of Delaware did raise the issue, though it finally did not
grant interim relief, saying "due process merely requires, in cases of this sort, that the plaintiff
have an opportunity to test the challenged action without suffering irreparable injury." Amoco
Prod. Co. v. United States Dept't of Energy, No. 78-463 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1979)(LEXIS, Genfed

library, Cases file).
47. Collins, supra note 5, at 282.

48. Z Ltd. v. A-Z, 1982 Q.B. 558, 573-74 (C.A.).
49. This is so evident to commentators on the relevant provision of the ZPO (§ 890) that they
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about a preliminary freezing order, which nonetheless allows disposal
50
of frozen assets of its client, is liable to the creditor.
B.

Freezing of assets, within and outside the jurisdiction, in support
offoreign litigation

Unlike the English court in the Duvalier matter, the United States
court had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
over Marcos. The power to issue a preliminary injunction was based
on "pendent" jurisdiction which led the dissenter to oppose the world51
wide reach of the injunction.
As far as an attachment is concerned, the jurisdiction of the issuing
court, though qualified in rem, and traditionally giving rise to quasi in
rem jurisdiction, is strictly dependent on the same court's having acquired personal jurisdiction.5 2 The court of the Southern District of
New York has found particularly telling words to express this principle:5 3 "So far as we know, there is no provision of New York law
which would authorize holding an attachment 'in limbo' pending the
outcome of litigation going forward in some other jurisdiction." The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 64) also seem to be clear in
this respect. An attachment can only be granted in such a way that
the subject matter litigation "shall be commenced and prosecuted pursuant to these rules." Following such reasoning, the Second Circuit
also refused to grant a preliminary injunction in a case where it only
54
had quasi in rem jurisdiction "over" the defendant.
But is this kind of reasoning really compelling? Should American
courts, once addressed like the British courts in the Duvalier case, really be prevented from freezing assets in the United States, let alone
assets world-wide? As the following discussion demonstrates, such a
conclusion cannot be inferred from overriding principles and, furthermore, would be inconsistent with case law and statutes relating to similar issues.
do not even raise the issue. See, e.g.

ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG,

supra note 43, at 2110 (discussing

whether the "debtor" is punishable for acts committed by third persons).
50. See, e.g., PALANDT BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 113-15 (49th ed. 1990) (§§ 135-37).
51. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F. 2d 1335, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988)(en banc),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989).
52. As distinct from being (under quasi in rem principles) obtainable.
53. Sanko S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Newfoundland Ref. Co., 411 F.Supp. 285, 286 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858.
54. Cargill, Inc. v. Sabine Trading & Shipping Co., 756 F.2d 224, 227, 230 (2d Cir. 1985).
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1. Lacking powers to freeze assets regardless of personal
jurisdiction on the merits - an inference from overriding
legal principles?
In this context, one should be particularly concerned not to confound subject matter (diversity of citizenship) and personal jurisdiction. Courts have often said that the jurisdiction to grant preliminary
injunctions is ancillary or auxiliary to the jurisdiction "over" the substance of the matter. 5 5 Those courts all refer expressly or impliedly to
Title 28 § 1651(a) U.S.C., which reads:
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions . .. ."
This, however, relates only to subject matter jurisdiction. The personal jurisdiction of the federal courts has never been the concern of
Congress and is established pursuant to the Supreme Court's minimum contacts doctrine. After Shaffer v. Heitner,5 6 the mere fact that
assets of the defendant are located within the jurisdiction no longer
justifies the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction - let alone personal
jurisdiction - over the substance of the matter, i.e., over the claim
giving rise to attachment or other prejudgment common law relief.
Yet, legal writers and courts alike5 7 draw the attention of Shaffer's
readers to a very telling passage in the judgment, which says 58 that the
traditional justification given for quasi in rem jurisdiction at most suggests "that a State in which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as security
for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be
maintained . . . ." In describing its holding thus, the Supreme Court
itself dissociated personal jurisdiction on provisional protective measures from personal jurisdiction on the subject matter. The former may
be based merely on the presence of assets within the jurisdiction or a
situation of urgency somehow located therein. While the court certainly focused on state court jurisdiction problems, no reason exists
why one should argue otherwise when foreign courts have jurisdiction
as to the merits. If it is a jurisdiction whose judgments are subject to
comity-based recognition and enforcement within the United States, it
55. E.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F. 2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1982),
aff'g 534 F.Supp. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("The substantive basis and the jurisdictional authority for
use of this procedure must be sought elsewhere"); Anthony v. Texaco, Inc., 803 F.2d 593, 596
(10th Cir. 1986), all referring to MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 65.03 (2d ed. 1948).
56. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
57. S. RIESENFELD, supra note 6, at 413; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. URANEX, 457 F.
Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1977); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 244 (1982).
58. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210.
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is all the more imperative to assist such courts as much as possible.
The doctrine of international comity, normally applied to restrict the
jurisdiction of domestic courts in internationally linked cases, 59 is well
capable of also inciting, if transnational justice so requires, the opposite inference that domestic courts' jurisdiction can be broadened.
Consequently, at least in those states where jurisdiction is as broad
as permitted under constitutional minimum contacts standards, 6 preliminary injunctions may be granted regardless of whether the respective contacts provide a proper head of jurisdiction as to the merits of
6
the case. '

One should even venture the next and last step and admit worldwide freezing orders, if evidence of the likelihood that at least some
assets are held within the jurisdiction is produced. Justice is severely
hindered if the victims of harm done by transnationally operating
wrongdoers would have to address a large variety of national courts to
get adequate interim protection. Location of assets within the jurisdiction justifies general (as opposed to specific) personal jurisdiction for
interim relief.
This justification exists all the more since a court, having granted
(world-wide) interim relief, remains free to readjust its measures to the
further development of the main proceedings, to remove its orders
should the court of the latter proceedings have been able to grant adequate interim relief in the meantime, or otherwise to express its view
about the desirability of support given to its work by foreign courts.
Such power of a "domestic court" exists even if the parties have,
by mutual agreement, derogated from its jurisdiction. Parties to jurisdiction agreements are not normally thought to have extended their
agreement to include provisional measures. One can easily refer to the
customary practice in the context of arbitration agreements.
2.

Similar fields where intensive relief may be granted though
jurisdiction as to the merits is lacking

Arbitration indeed is one of the three fields where American law is
willing to grant interim protective relief even though neither federal
nor state courts have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. In
59. E.g., The Bremen v. Zapato Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

60. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1972); see also G. BORN AND D. WESTIN, supra note 39, at 21. Contra, e.g., Banco Ambrosiano v. Artco Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65,
464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (N.Y. 1984).
61. This was indeed the conclusion reached by the Court in Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
URANEX, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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the case underlying the leading decision, 62 $85 million owed to the
French defendant corporation had been attached ex parte in California
even though the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement
providing for arbitration in New York. The case is particularly telling
since, even absent arbitration agreement, the court would not have had
jurisdiction over the defendant. 63 Some courts temporarily opposed
this view in cases where the U.N. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 1958 was applicable to the arbitration agreement. 64 The New York courts even excluded, as a matter of
principle, 65 interim relief in aid of arbitration. But New York
lawmakers reacted promptly. 66 The relevant provision of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (§ 7502(c)) now reads as follows:
(c) Provisional remedies. The supreme court in the county in which an
arbitration is pending, or, if not yet commenced, in a county specified in subdivision (a), may entertain an application for an order of
attachment or for a preliminary injunction in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to
which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual
without such provisional relief. The provisions of articles 62 and 63
of this chapter shall apply to the application including those relating
to undertakings and to the time of commencement of an action (arbitration shall be deemed an action for this purpose) if the arbitration
is made before commencement.
Apparently, the issue has been settled. It may be that judicial interim
support of arbitration has been provided for because very often concurrent litigation is only stayed. In another field, a similar kind of
independent ancillary proceeding has been developed, although, unlike
in arbitration, no residuary jurisdiction for the substance of the matter
is involved. Pursuant to § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, proceedings
62. Id. at 1045.
63. The court maintained the attachment for 30 days, during which time the plaintiff was to
file "an action directed to the underlying merits in a jurisdiction that [had] in personam jurisdiction over defendant." Id. at 1049. One wonders what this jurisdiction could be. Given the fact

that arbitral proceedings pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement had already been initiated, an
action aiming at compelling arbitration would be meaningless. Possibly the court had in mind an
action to be stayed immediately after its commencement pending arbitration. Yet, probably no

court having personal jurisdiction existed within the United States.
64. McCreary Tire & Rubber Co v. CEAT, 501 F. 2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974); I.T.A.D. Assocs.
v. Rodar Bros., 636 F. 2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 139
A.D. 323, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547, lv. denied, 73 N.Y.2d 703, 537 N.Y.S.2d 490, 534 N.E.2d 328
(1988).
65. Cooper v. Ateliers de laMotobecane, 57 N.Y.2d 408, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 456 N.Y.S.2d
728 (N.Y. 1982).
66. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 7502 (1) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1990). The words "in the
country which an arbitration is pending" seem to indicate that provisional remedies would not be
available should arbitration be pending outside the jurisdiction. This conclusion, however, seems
unconvincing since "a court in any county" has power to issue such orders as long as arbitration
has not yet started and no arbitration locale has been stipulated by the parties.
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ancillary to foreign bankruptcy proceedings are available in the
United States. The powers given in this context to the United States
bankruptcy courts are rather broad and not exhaustively enumerated:
"The court may... order other appropriate relief" (§ 304(b)(3)). This
enables a court to grant a kind of relief which may be unavailable in
the court where the main bankruptcy proceedings are pending. In
most foreign bankruptcy laws, American-style discharge, for example,
is unknown. The United States court can, however, grant it in ancillary proceedings. It can even appoint an independent administrator
for the assets located within the United States. 67 It is well justified to
see a general principle of American law embodied in § 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code, since it certainly "represents a codified common
' ' 68
law principle of comity.

Finally, there exists a third field where proceedings ancillary to
foreign "main" proceedings are permissible and even favored by statutes. It is the field of transnational disclosure and discovery, the subject of the last part of this study.
II.

WORLD-WIDE DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY

In the field of transnational fact- and evidence-gathering, codification efforts by means of international treaties have been much more
advanced than those regarding interim relief, in which they are lacking
save for the Brussels Convention. Since the beginning of this century,
"Hague Conventions" have dealt with transnational "taking of evidence." Nowadays the most important countries, including the
United States, are Member States of the Convention of Oct. 26, 1968
69
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters.
No obstacle exists in principle to the application of this convention
to provisional protective measures, since article 1 of the Convention
says that "a judicial authority of a Contracting State ...may request
the competent authority of another Contracting State ... to obtain
evidence or to perform otherjudicial acts."
There can be no doubt that an attachment or a preliminary injunction is a judicial act distinguishable from a decision on the merits of
the case. Therefore, at first glance, it may seem surprising that no
court has requested that any other court issue such an order. In civil
67. In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
68. In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, 10 Bankr. 790, 791 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
69. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. This
was preceded by the Convention relating to civil procedure, opened for signature July 17, 1905,
99 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 990.
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law countries, the explanation should probably lie in the Hague Convention's specification that assistance should be requested in accordance with the provisions "of the law of (the requesting) state." No
such provision relating to interim relief exists in civil law countries. In
common law countries, however, the lawmaking and equitable powers
of the courts would be available to request protective assistance from
foreign authorities. In view of the general policy underlying the
Hague Evidence (and "other judicial acts") Convention, it would be
worth trying to encourage courts mutually to request such international collaboration, though a couple of problems would arise in this
context. 70 Yet, as has been pointed out, no such attempts have ever
been made. Hence, the practical impact of the Convention is limited
to what it was primarily made for: to provide for access to evidentiary
rniaterials and testimony not under the control of either party nor obtainable within the jurisdiction. For the rest, the Convention seems to
have appeared unsuitable.
This is particularly true with regard to interrogatories and depositions of the litigating parties, as opposed to witnesses and other third
parties, and disclosure and inspection of documents under the control
of the parties. Two years ago, the United States Supreme Court 7 very
convincingly stated in its "Aerospatiale" decision that public international law does not require the use of the official channels of international legal assistance in order to gain access to evidentiary materials
and testimony which, though located abroad, is under the control of
the defendant. Whether or not the defendant has his residence within
the jurisdiction is irrelevant. International law allows the ordering of
litigants to produce whatever they control, provided it can be transported. Furthermore, though with only a 5 to 4 vote, the court rejected the proposition that a plaintiff must first resort to the methods
of the Hague Convention. Rather, the court held that an analysis in
terms of international comity is due in each individual case. In some
circumstances, this might result in the imposition upon the party seeking extraterritorial discovery of a first effort within the framework of
the Convention. There is sufficient evidence, however, to believe that
in practice the direct approach prevails almost to the exclusion of the
72
Convention.
The decision of the Supreme Court has given rise to an abundance
70. For example, the problem of damages due to the defendant should the interim protection
subsequently prove to have been unjustified because the claim as to the merits is invalid.
71. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
538 (1987).
72. Eg., Sandsend Financial Consultants v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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of commentary. 73 It is not the purpose of this study to lengthen this
list. Only one point must be made. The court was particularly attentive to the special concerns of foreigners:
American Courts... should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign
litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, disWhen it is
covery may place them in a disadvantageous position ....
necessary to seek evidence abroad ... the district court must supervise
pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent discovery abuses....
advance should
Objections to "abusive" discovery that foreign litigants
74
therefore receive the most careful consideration.
These anti-parochial remarks, however, are not suitable for any broad
generalization. Foreigners should, of course, not be discriminated
against in court proceedings. But no reason exists to privilege them.
Instead of further commenting on the Supreme Court's decision,
this study is primarily aimed at focusing on the inverse issue. In Aerospatiale, the issue was to what extent parties litigating in an American
court have access to evidence located abroad under American standards. The new issue, which has been little discussed so far, is
whether parties litigating abroad have access, under domestic standards, to evidence located or to be disclosed within the domestic jurisdiction. The United States has a very liberal tradition in this respect
in not objecting to attorneys, as commissioners of foreign courts, or
even to foreign judges questioning people, subject, of course, to the
latter's willingness to cooperate voluntarily. 75 Regrettably, most of
the European states would see an unacceptable intrusion into their na76
tional sovereignty if they should tolerate the same.
The crucial question, however, is whether fact-gathering in a foreign country, e.g. the United States, can be enforced there against recalcitrant persons. It can, of course, by means of the Hague Evidence
Convention. Yet these ways are burdensome and time-consuming.
73. E.g., Note, A Look Behind the Aerospatiale Curtain,or Why the Hague Evidence Convention Had To Be Effectively Nullified, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269 (1988)(authored by J. Albert Garcia); Recent Developments, Sociti Nationale v. United States District Court.: International
Discovery Under the Hague Evidence Convention, 62 TUL. L.REv. 828 (authored by Traynham E.
Mitchell, Jr.); Recent Developments, Discovery: Application of the Hague Evidence Convention in
United States Courts, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 160 (authored by Catherine E. Woodward); Judicial
Decisions, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 944 (1987)(authored by Monroe Leigh); Griffin, Proceduresfor
Civil Discovery Outside the United States after Aerospatiale, 15 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. INT'L Bus.
LAW. 350 (1987); Feldman, Foreign Discovery. A New Complication, TRIAL, Mar. 1988, at 67.
74. Sociiti Nationale, 482 U.S. at 546.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(b) (1988) ("This chapter does not preclude a person within the United
States from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other
thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any
manner acceptable to him").
76. With regard to Germany, see, e.g., A. JUNKER, DISCOVERY IMDEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSVERKEHR

1987).

347 (Abhandlungen zum Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft No. 4,
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More important, fact-gathering abroad under the Hague Evidence
Convention is dependent upon a request made by "a judicial authority." A party to a lawsuit pending outside the United States is not
very likely to obtain such an official request if he is aiming at American-style discovery, since many, if not all, American discovery devices
are unknown in European countries and do not have any counterpart
there to serve a similar purpose.
Two new devices are worth contemplating:
A. A preliminary injunction granted at the request of one of the parties and ordering disclosure of facts or documents;
B. A discovery order, issued at the request of one of the parties.
A.

Party-requestedpreliminary injunctions ordering disclosure.

As has been shown, the English Court of Appeal, in its decision
concerning Jean-Claude Duvalier, ordered that the location even of
those assets which might not be located within the jurisdiction be disclosed. The English judges found a particularly effective form for
their order. In the words of the appellate judges: "[T]he defendants
were ordered, acting by [their solicitors], to disclose to the plaintiffs'
solicitors ...information known to [the defendants' solicitors] as to
the nature, location and value of those defendants' assets[.]"77
The freezing injunction issued by the American court against
Marcos did not order any disclosure, probably because the government of the Philippines was glad to have gotten the freezing order at
all. Nevertheless, no obstacle exists to supplementing a preliminary
freezing injunction with such a disclosure component. In one case involving the Federal Trade Commission as a claimant, the judges, without giving any comment on their power to do so, ordered that "[the]
defendants . . . shall file . . . all current accountants' reports, bank

statements, documents indicating title to real or personal property,
and other indicia of ownership or interest in property of any of the
defendants which indicia of ownership or interest are now in any of
78
the aforenamed defendants' actual or constructive possession."1
Once freezing orders in lieu of attachments, particularly worldwide ones, have become a well-accepted remedy, courts will certainly
not refuse to have them supplemented, in proper circumstances, by
disclosure orders. Though it is established practice that courts should
grant mandatory preliminary injunctions with extreme caution, it is,
77. Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier, [1989] 2 W.L.R. at 265 (emphasis added).
78. Federal Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'g 532
F.Supp. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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nonetheless, equally clear that nothing in the law precludes them from
ordering disclosure. Among all forms of possible mandatory injunctive relief, disclosure orders are the least likely to produce illegitimate
harm to the person so ordered. Furthermore, nothing forbids the
courts from dissociating disclosure from freezing and issuing isolated
preliminary disclosure injunctions only.
It is to be anticipated that the English courts will not refuse to
issue isolated Mareva disclosure orders, if so requested, because, for
example, the claimant does not see any prospect of any assets effectively being frozen by an English order. Nevertheless, circumstances
justifying only disclosure, but not freezing, and yet permitting exercise
in the United States of personal jurisdiction (if for interim relief only)
are not likely to be found. Furthermore, if discovery under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26 et seq. is available, the claimant must, of course, proceed
under the Federal Rules. Thus, in a "tracing case,"' 79 because the disclosure of the existence and location of certain assets was held to relate
to the substance of the matter, the court refused to grant a protective
order on the grounds that the information sought did not relate to the
subject matter of the dispute.
B.

Party-requesteddiscovery in aid of foreign proceedings

Just as under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, interim protection discovery may also be sought in aid of foreign proceedings. The
practical interest of the issue derives from the fact that the American
legal system provides for discovery to an extent far beyond any other
country, including common law countries. 80
The relevant legal provision in the United States is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a), which reads:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or to produce a document or other
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or in an international tribunal.
The order may be made ... upon the application of any interested person. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise the testimony or statement shall be taken and the document or other thing be
produced in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 '
79. E.g., Hawes v. C.E. Cook & Co., 64 F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Mich. 1974), vacated without op.
sub. nom. United States v. Bernabei, 538 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1976).
80. With regard to the United Kingdom, see, e.g., J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW (1982). The main differences (discovery from third parties; no fishing expeditions) have been pointedly explained by Lord Viscount Dilhorne in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434, 45261 (H.L.).
81. 28 U.S.C § 1782(a) (1988). Fortunately, no requirement of reciprocity exists. John Deere
Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
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Four points may be of particular interest for parties litigating abroad:
a) The testimony of third parties may be sought. For English proceedings, the interest exists in the unavailability in England of any
"pre-trial" discovery from third parties. 82 This does not seem reason
enough for an American court not to use its discretionary powers to
compel a witness. Instead, the American magistrate should use his
discretion and give assistance to the parties as the English judiciary
assisted the French courts by making orders which the French courts
could not make due to the shortcomings of the French legal order. Of
course, this does not preclude the American magistrate from scrutinizing with "special vigilance" to determine whether seeking American
style discovery in aid of British or otherwise foreign proceedings is
reasonable in the circumstances.
b) Under German law, as under all other civil law systems, the
pre-trial phase is not distinguishable from the trial. Hence, no discovery is available at all. The judge, sometimes one of the members of the
judicial panel, is responsible for the fact- and evidence-gathering subject to the allegations and requests of the parties. Fictitiously, parties
are invariably supposed to have acquired, by informal investigation, as
much knowledge of the facts as may be necessary to formulate specific
allegations about all the issues involved. 83 This acquisition, in principle, must already be complete in the complaint initiating the proceedings. Hence, does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) require that the "proceeding in
a foreign court" be instituted? Not in an absolute sense. If the applicant explains to the satisfaction of the court that under the rules of the
foreign court it would be unreasonable to bring proceedings prior to
the discovery sought, the court should grant the order, thus bridging
the differences in the two procedural systems.
c) English and continental law do not allow fishing expeditions.
In an unpublished case recently decided by one of the Florida district
courts, 84 a French claimant had sued a German corporation for
breach of contract by selling an unidentified quantity of merchandise
82. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij "de Zeven Provincien" N.V., [1988]
3 W.L.R 398, 404 (H.L. 1986) (per Lord Brandon) ("[T]here is no way in which a party to an
action in the High Court in England can compel pre-trial discovery as against a person who is
not a party to such action, either by way of the disclosure and inspection of documents in his
possession or power, or by way of giving oral or written testimony").
83. Very accurately described in Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986).
84. The main proceedings were arbitral ones conducted under the International Chamber of
Commerce system and certainly not governed by American law. The magistrate who ordered
discovery apparently included arbitral tribunals into "international tribunals," such as appear in
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). This broad reading should be favored, though the term "tribunal" has been
used to include "quasi-judicial" proceedings. In re Letter Rogatory from the Justice Ct., District
of Montreal, Can., 523 F. 2d 562, 565 (6th Cir. 1975) (quoting Senate report).
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into the American market. The French had only a vague suspicion
about this breach and the possible wholesale purchaser. The plaintiff
obtained an order compelling the defendant to be deposed, and thus
found that the defendant had indeed purchased from the vendor a
large quantity of goods.
If the purchaser had resided in Germany or France, it would have
been difficult to conduct such a fishing expedition against him. Under
American standards, if the French plaintiff had had no information
other than newspaper advertising, he would have been entitled to discovery of the newspaper. Under European standards, he certainly
would not have been allowed to do so because of the "fishing" nature
of the expedition. Nevertheless, the magistrate in Florida was correct
in ordering the deposition and would have been correct in ordering the
deposition of the newspaper people. He would have helped supplement the shortcomings of German and French law, which do not provide for access to all information "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."
d) The most delicate issue is discovery from parties. The issue has
never been approached so far: assuming one litigant in English or
German proceedings has an opponent residing or to be found in the
United States, it is possible to compel him to depose there under oath,
subject him to fishing expeditions or have him produce documents of
any kind "set forth ...

by categories" -

in the extreme broadness of

the term as customarily used in the United States. Under neither German nor English standards could such an order be obtained. The
American court should not, in principle, refrain from assisting litigants in such a way. As the government of Haiti, absent the English
"judiciary's" generous assistance, would not have gained access to
Duvalier's assets, a litigant in a German or English court might be
deprived of crucial information if American courts reacted in a parochial way to his requests.
FINAL REMARKS

It cannot be forgotten that the type of assistance I have suggested a
court of one country should give to the courts in another or, more
precisely, to the parties litigating there, may not be appreciated.
Whether or not interim protective measures will be granted, comitybased recognition and enforcement is doubtful. In some legal orders,
enforcement of non-final foreign judgments would be excluded. Even
the English Court of Appeal could only express its hope that its
"world-wide" Mareva injunction would be recognized and enforced
abroad. Additional problems may be raised in the context of third

172
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parties to be bound by extraterritorial protective orders. However, it
is unlikely that "world-wide" interim protection would be met with
fundamental distrust.
The same is true with extraterritorial discovery and disclosure orders. Information obtained abroad may not be admissible due to privilege standards of the forum not being observed where the information
was obtained. It is unlikely, however, that information legally obtained in a foreign country would be met with fundamental distrust
just because its discovery would have been incapable of enforcement in
the forum's state. This includes information obtained by fishing expeditions. The very success of the expedition is evidence enough that it
was not oppressive.

